This article analyzes a majority's decision to institute judicial review as a method of final decision-making on questions of constitutional rights. Adopting the proceduralist viewpoint, the article argues that this type of decision-involving majoritarian renunciation of its own powerrequires a greater justification than majority decisions that do not alter future decision-making procedures. That greater justification requires these types of decisions, decisions this article terms "delegation decisions," to satisfy two conditions. First, the procedural mechanism the majority gives power to must be a fair procedure. Second, the procedural mechanism must also be appropriate for decisions of the kind it is supposed to make. The article then argues that proceduralists can embrace these conditions and that judicial review satisfies them. Judicial review as practiced by an ideal constitutional court is a fair procedure for rights questions because it exemplifies qualities such as anonymity and neutrality that are central to procedural fairness. And a constitutional court is appropriate for deciding constitutional rights questions because its virtues-particularly its transparency, deliberative capacity, principled reasoning, and impartiality-are relevant for these questions and mitigate distortions in the decision-making process concerning rights. Others hold that limits on majoritarian decision-making are wrongheaded and dangerous.
INTRODUCTION
In his Notes on the State of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson famously remarked: "An elective despotism was not the government we fought for."
1 He believed-and most democratic theorists Sally wants B, and Remi wants A; when we feed these inputs into the democracy machine, it spits out choice A. But, as Richard Wollheim asks "why should someone who has fed his choice into the machine and then is confronted by the machine with a choice non-identical with his own, feel any obligation to accept it." Why, in other words, should Sally accept that A is somehow binding on her? The proceduralist claims that the answer to that question is that choice A was made by employing a fair decision-making procedure. By treating her fairly, the procedure put her and all the other citizens' preferences on a level playing field. In a world of ineradicable moral disagreement, there can be no ultimate arbiter of moral or political truth to which Sally could appeal to "prove" that her policy preference was best. In the absence of some such overarching standard, fair treatment is the most we can expect from the process that creates binding decisions for us.
While the full merits of proceduralism are beyond the scope of this article, I assume that proceduralism gives the most complete and philosophically satisfying response to the question of political legitimacy. That response, in short, is that "the source for democratic legitimacy is found in citizens' participation in a process or a series of processes in which they each have liberal democratic theory. 14 It is a starting point for settling the later disagreement between proceduralists and instrumentalists about the value of democracy, not a concession to the instrumentalist account. Because the overwhelming majority of instrumentalists and proceduralists accept this premise, its acceptance does not pre-judge the issue of political legitimacy. But it does indicate that any account of legitimacy will have to show how and why that theory vindicates the individual interests in liberty and equality.
The article proceeds in two stages. Part I argues that there is an important and consequential distinction between substantive decisions that directly adjust benefits and burdens (e.g., a minimum wage law) and process-altering decisions that alter the procedures by which future decisions are made (e.g., the election of a dictator). The first of these decisions is not obviously open to direct critique by the proceduralist, assuming fair procedures were followed in making it. But the second, I argue, is squarely in the proceduralist's evaluative domain. After drawing this distinction, Part II argues that the legitimacy of the latter type of decision rests on it satisfying two conditions: (1) the new procedure to which an issue is delegated must be a fair procedure, and (2) the new procedure must be an appropriate procedure for making decisions on the delegated issue. Part II also sketches the case for judicial review's legitimacy on this account, assuming that the practice has been instituted by a majority vote on the matter. Finally, Part III responds to the objection that these criteria are outcome-based criteria that cannot properly be invoked by the proceduralist.
14 Corey Brettschneider's novel "value theory of democracy" invokes a different (but related) set of "three core values of democracy: equality of interests, political autonomy, and reciprocity." Brettschneider, "The Value Theory of Democracy," 261.
I. ON PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE
This Part distinguishes between two types of decisions that can be made by majority decision-assuming throughout the article that majority decision is a fair procedure and that it is the default fair procedure in a democracy. 15 The first type of decision directly alters the substantive distribution of resources, while the second type of decision alters only the procedures used to make decisions on future issues. Though there might be questions on the margins, it is usually clear when a decision alters a decision-making procedure. That is, "we are familiar with cases in which the use of decision-procedure A yields as an output the conclusion that, henceforth, procedure B, rather than A, should be used." 16 The decision to enact a minimum wage law, for example, does not itself change the way in which future decisions, on minimum wage or other issues, are made. But the decision to elect a dictator necessarily changes the procedure for future political decisions. To make this clearer, imagine three decisions made by the majority using fair decision-making procedure X:
D1: All children under sixty pounds must be secured in a car seat while riding in an automobile.
D2: No public monies shall be spent on the education of African-Americans.
D3: All decisions regarding A-type issues should be made using procedure Y instead of procedure X.
The first decision (D1) is unproblematic. We think this is exactly the sort of decision that can be made by the state and justified on the basis of the procedure followed, even if-or especially if-there is deep disagreement about the best way to protect children riding in cars or the weight at which some such protections become futile or counterproductive. For proceduralists, the use of fair procedure X makes this decision legitimate. But delegation decisions are different. The procedural provenance of the decision can no longer give citizens the same kind of reason to follow the decision. It can no longer be sufficient (though it is still necessary). It would be illogical to tell a citizen that she should follow decision D merely because it was produced by procedure P if D just is the rejection of P. The grounding of D, because it necessarily relies on P (for the proceduralist), is undercut when P is removed.
Importantly, this does not mean that majority decision can never alter majority procedures. It simply means that something more is required to justify these delegation decisions than is required to justify substantive decisions. 22 Delegation decisions cannot undermine their own foundation by eliding the very fairness on which their legitimacy relies. I deal with the objection that this argument is no longer proceduralist in Part III but first I turn to the additional procedural conditions that I argue are necessary for delegation legitimacy.
21 But, as Eric Beerbohm helpfully points out, the obligation remains defeasible: "[W]hether a law is democratic depends upon the fair process by which citizens participated in its production. It is a further question whether the law is all-things-considered morally justified." Beerbohm, "Democracy as an Inflationary Concept," Representation 47 (2011) 
II. LEGITIMATING DELEGATION
The majoritarian creation of judicial review is a delegation decision because it alters the procedure by which certain rights-questions are decided. In a state without judicial review, the majority conclusively determines what rights citizens have and what counts as an infringement of those rights. Because voting to institute judicial review involves delegation, the decision must fulfill the two conditions of delegation legitimacy: institute both a fair procedure and one that is appropriate for these types of rights questions.
A. CONDITION ONE: THE FAIRNESS FACTOR
The first condition requires that, in order for a delegation decision to be legitimate, the new procedure to which it delegates issues must be a fair procedure. Before analyzing this condition, it is necessary to deal with an objection to the necessity of procedural fairness. A critic might question why the new procedure that is employed for making decisions on the delegated issue must be fair if we are already assured that the original procedure that generated the new procedure was fair. That is, if we assume majority vote is fair, then why should we the have to analyze the fairness of the procedure that subsequently takes the place of majority vote for some issues.
We can think through an answer to this question by imagining the situation aboard a crowded lifeboat where not all of us can remain. Jeremy Waldron and Ronald Dworkin, representing opposite spectrums of the proceduralist-instrumentalist divide, both agree that it would be unfair here to use majority vote to decide whom we should force to leave the lifeboat.
But Waldron persuasively argues that it is perfectly fine to use majority vote to decide which procedure, among all those possible, to use for the first order decision about whom to actually throw off. 23 We could use majority vote, in other words, to decide between drawing straws, picking lots, or other procedures for making the lower-level decision about who should go overboard. Importantly, however, Waldron recognizes that the choice of which procedure to use for deciding whom to throw off should be between procedures other than majority vote. 24 That is, we shouldn't be able to use majority vote at the second level to choose majority vote as the first-level procedure for deciding whom to throw off. It strikes me that this is a strong case for the notion that even the new procedures to which a majority delegates decision-making authority must be fair. There would be no reason for an individual to follow the majority's decision to institute an unfair procedure for deciding whom to throw off. If majority vote would be unfair to decide the question directly, then using majority vote to pick majority vote as the method would likewise be unfair. It seems, then, that the delegated procedure must also be fair in order for it to command adherence as the product of a legitimate decision.
Returning to the condition itself, the fairness criterion requires that the new procedure to which the delegable issues are delegated be a fair one. Here I draw on two primary values of majority vote-neutrality and anonymity-that are central to its fairness and show how they can be exemplified by judicial review. Before this, however, I should clarify the role of this argument in my defense of judicial review. In this section, I need only show that judicial review is a fair procedure for deciding an outcome on a question of constitutional rights. This is a rather low threshold. Multiple, competing procedures are fair (e.g., lottery, coin flip, etc.) and fairness alone is too a thin a concept to rest democratic legitimacy on. Yet fairness is still necessary for legitimacy. Here, rather than simply make a thin argument from intuition that judicial review satisfies our considered notion of fairness, I make the stronger claim that it exemplifies (several 23 Waldron, "A Majority in the Lifeboat," 1050-51. 24 Id.
of) the values of procedural fairness that majority vote does. If this stronger claim fails, the argument that judicial review is still "fair" in the way that a coin flip or lottery draw is fair would suffice to satisfy condition one.
Instantiation of four central procedural values is commonly thought to form the core of the procedural fairness of majority vote: decisiveness, anonymity, neutrality, and positive responsiveness. 25 Relevant here, anonymity means that the procedure reaches the same outcome if two participants trade preferences-the procedure is blind to who holds which preference. In other words, "anonymity means that the winner(s) should not depend on which voter has which preference; only the preferences themselves matter." 26 Neutrality is the reverse: if the preferences trade places the outcome is the same-the procedure does not favor one outcome over any other. May's theorem has shown that majority vote uniquely satisfies these four criteria in a choice over two alternatives. 27 But an ideal form of judicial review can, I argue, exemplify traits of both neutrality and anonymity. And the exemplification of these two important procedural properties provides more than just intuitive reasons to believe that judicial review is a fair method for making decisions about individual right.
There are two ways to characterize neutrality as a procedural value. What we might call thin, or formal, neutrality merely mandates that the procedure itself evince no bias toward one or another outcome. Christopher Peters offers an illustration of how formal this concept of thin neutrality is: "Suppose the rule in the applicable jurisdiction is that verdicts in civil cases must be unanimous. This procedure-a form of minority rule, as it gives disproportionate power to a 26 On the robustness of majority vote, p. 957. 27 Peter sums of the force of May's work: "Kenneth O. May shows that majority rule is the only social decision rule that satisfies four minimal axioms. The work that these axioms do is to specify a fair democratic procedure." Peter, "Democratic Legitimacy and Proceduralist Social Epistemology," Politics, Philosophy & Economics 6 (2007): 333. small number of holdouts-also is 'neutral as between the contested outcomes' in the sense that it does not incorporate some inherent preference for one verdict over the other."
28 But this thin
concept is not what we value when we value the fact that a procedure is neutral among outcomes.
What we really value is thick neutrality. For a decision procedure to exhibit thick neutrality, the procedure must treat participants' views equally in some relevant respect. It may require equal weight (in, say, the voting context), equal voice (in, say, a dispute resolution setting), or equal chance (in, say, the lottery draw). The particular kind of equality that is necessary for thick neutrality requires attention to the broad, overarching context of the decision. 124-25. 29 Even if this makes fairness partially relative to the context, it is still a relativity that is far more blunt than the appropriateness inquiry. It considers one component of fairness to demand different qualities in large subcategories of human action, whereas the appropriateness inquiry looks to the very specific context of individualized decision-making. 30 Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 137.
The second important fairness value that judicial review exemplifies is anonymity. A decision procedure "is anonymous if and only if no difference is made in the collective ordering if the identity of the owner of the preference ranking is changed." 31 Or we could say that the procedure is anonymous if the outcome remains the same when the litigants change sides. Notice that neutrality and anonymity both get at the same concern: we don't want decisions made for irrelevant reasons, whether in the context of voting or deciding disputes (or, we might add, in the context of deciding whom to throw off the lifeboat). But they get at that concern differently. Neutrality requires that no outputs be favored; anonymity that no inputs be. In the context of judicial review, this means not only that judges must decide cases ex post instead of ex ante (the neutrality factor), but also that nothing about who the particular litigants are influences their decision (the anonymity factor). We could test the anonymity of the judicial procedure by determining whether the outcome would change if the litigants reversed their roles. So long as the outcome would remain the same, judicial review is an anonymous procedure.
I have argued that judicial review as a procedure for constitutional rights questions can exemplify both the kind of neutrality and the kind of anonymity that we think crucial to procedural fairness. But there is also another aspect to judicial review that deserves mention. In nearly all the multi-member constitutional courts in the world, decisions are made on the basis of simple majority vote. Though it is beyond the scope of this article to deal with how this internal mechanism might further affect the analysis, it should be sufficient to say that it does nothing to undermine the case for the procedural fairness of judicial review. procedural perspective) that judges use majority vote, it only helps the case for judicial review's legitimacy. 32 That judicial review is both anonymous and thickly neutral provide compelling reasons to think it is fair. The procedure is more than just the final vote that the judges make on the case. It involves argument, persuasion, deliberation, compromise, and other aspects of collective decision-making characteristic of a "forum of principle."
33 Yet it is possible that a procedure could possess these attributes and still be an all-things-considered unfair procedure; so too could another procedure lack one or both of these attributes and still be an all-things-considered fair procedure. The argument here does not, in other words, prove in any strict sense that judicial review is fair. What it does do is give us more than just intuitive reasons to think that the practice is fair. Beyond this, however, our intuitions that it is fair are powerfully convincing.
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B. CONDITION TWO: APPROPRIATENESS
Condition two requires that the new procedure be an appropriate procedure for the kind of decision delegated to it. The need for a value of appropriateness arises from the recognition that there must be some kind of agreement or "fit" between the subject matter of the decision and the procedure employed to make it. This, I submit, is fundamentally different from requiring simply that the procedure be fair. Take, for example, a coin flip. We can all agree that flipping a coin is a fair decision-making procedure. So too may be drawing straws, choosing by lottery, and many other types of procedures employed in everyday decision-making. But we would also all 32 Some argue that it does nothing either way, e.g., Guha Krishnamurthi et. 34 For instance, it is reported that in the United Kingdom, 71 percent of the population supported instituting strong judicial review when this option was being considered. See Waldron, "A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights," 46. This would be hard to square with a belief that the procedure was unfair. Waldron marvels over this aspect of judicial review: "It is remarkable that people put up with this-for example that supporters of Vice-President Gore were willing to accept the bare majority decision in Bush v. Gore." Waldron, "Five to Four: Why do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?," 23 n. 40. And yet it seems that our considered judgments do reveal judicial review to be a fair decision-making procedure for constitutional rights questions.
agree that using that coin flip to decide whether an accused murderer is guilty or not is inappropriate. As Adam Samaha puts it, "[f]lipping a coin to decide a case is among the most serious forms of judicial misconduct."
35 I think this is more than a matter of mere semantics.
That is, flipping a coin does not cease to be fair in the context of a judge's decision about an accused's guilt. Rather, its procedural flaw is that it is not appropriate for deciding that type of question.
When determining whether a certain procedure is appropriate for a particular type of decision, several factors are key. First, the procedural values exemplified by the procedure should be relevant for the kind of decision being made. For example, one of the important procedural values exemplified by the coin flip is equal weighting of the alternatives. So if equal weight were important for the decision being made, then, ceteris paribus, a coin flip would be appropriate for making that decision. If, however, the type of decision was not one for which equal weight was a benefit-say, a decision by a group of disagreeable doctors about how to best treat a patient-then a coin flip would be inappropriate to use in making that decision. Note too that we would normally agree that equal weighting in the medical context would miss something important about the nature of these types of decisions (i.e., that there are verifiably right answers in this domain). Second, if the type of issue is naturally prone to distortive influences, the procedure should eliminate the influence of extraneous factors-or at least cabin those factors as much as possible. This second criterion is not primarily a fairness concern because, to the extent the type of decision is incorporated into the analysis, the fairness inquiry paints with too broad a brush to determine if a particular decision is prone to distortive influence; the fairness inquiry simply determines whether the procedure is fair in the abstract (or in a broad category of human affairs). For example, deciding by majority vote is a fair procedure in a broad swath of human affairs-from choosing a restaurant for a group dinner to electing the president of a state-but it will be inappropriate in some particular contexts, such as picking which passenger should leave the lifeboat if not all can remain. In other words, the appropriateness inquiry takes a more finegrained approach to decision-making than the fairness analysis allows.
The importance of this second criterion can be seen in the judge's decision about the accused's guilt. One of the reasons a criminal trial, with its attendant procedural rules, is appropriate for deciding the guilt or innocence of the accused is that the procedure is designed to minimize the risk of irrelevant and arbitrary factors influencing the decision. And removing these extraneous factors does not imply a purely instrumental reason for the appropriateness inquiry.
Consider, for instance, that we might want to remove extraneous factors from the decisionmaking process in the lifeboat without thinking that that improves any kind of instrumental accuracy-if accuracy even has any meaning for decisions made in the lifeboat situation.
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The appropriateness condition thus requires choosing from the set of possible fair decision-making procedures one that fits the context. In short, decision-making procedureseven fair ones-are not fungible. This is the point David Estlund misses in his critique of the position he calls "fair proceduralism." 37 From his thin description of fairness-and the recognition that many procedures are "fair"-he concludes that "[f]air proceduralism, which would be satisfied by flipping a coin, is not a plausible account of the superiority of democratic principles and institutions over coin flips." 38 No reasonable account of democratic proceduralism should allow a coin flip to be substituted for majority vote on routine matters of legislation. But without something like the appropriateness condition, proceduralism seems devastated by this 36 Commenting on this example, Waldron remarks: "I suspect Dworkin is right that a particular decision of this kind is likely to summon up all sorts of motives which, however compelling they are personally for each passenger, are not relevant from the perspective of the group." Waldron, "A Majority in the Lifeboat," 1053. substantive, procedure-independent values should sometimes limit majority decision-making; I contend that the appropriateness condition does this necessary work to circumscribe how the majority can relinquish its power.
In his insightful response to Estlund's argument, Christiano recognizes the importance of the link between the type of decision being made and the procedure employed to make it.
Christiano sees this as part of the fairness analysis, that "what fairness demands or even recommends depends on the enterprise that is being regulated by fairness." 40 Eschewing any notion of essential fairness, he argues that Estlund's account creates too stringent a requirement for the fair proceduralist. Like Christiano, I think Estlund's critique of fair proceduralism fails to adequately take stock of the differences in the "enterprise that is being regulated." But I think
Estlund is right that procedures such as a coin flip are still "unimpeachably fair procedures."
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We should not, in other words, vary our concept of fairness to match each individual, micro-level decisional context. Instead, the appropriateness condition offers a way to validate our judgment that some clearly fair procedures-like a coin flip or random lottery-are inappropriate to use in some contexts.
The two overarching principles I identified as guiding the appropriateness analysis can be illustrated in the reasons we reject majority vote as an appropriate procedure in the lifeboat 
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Dworkin uses the lifeboat situation to argue that majority vote is not an intrinsically fair
procedure, but what it really seems to illustrate is that majority vote is inappropriate in this situation. By disaggregating the fairness inquiry from the appropriateness inquiry, we can save our intuition that procedures like majority vote, a coin flip, and a lottery draw are fair procedures without having to give up the feeling that there is something wrong about using these methods in particular situations. And any analytical framework that vindicates our considered notions of fairness should be preferred to one that requires rejecting (or reforming) some of our foundational beliefs.
I argued that the concept of appropriateness is illuminated by two principles: (1) I argue that four important procedural values qualify judicial review as an appropriate procedure for deciding constitutional rights questions: transparency, deliberative capacity, principled reasoning, and impartiality. Though these values may also be helpful instrumentally, in leading judges to the "right" answer, any instrumental value they possess-or lack-is irrelevant for my argument. 44 In other words, these are attributes we value regardless of the outcome. And, consistent with the two principles outlined above, these are the kinds of attributes 43 Kavanagh, "Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron," 466. To be fair, Kavanagh calls these reasons "instrumental" reasons, but they do not seem to be necessarily so. I hope to show in the rest of this section why they need not be instrumental values only. 44 Spector also expresses the view that this process is valuable because it "allows the direct participation of the right holder in the deliberation, and warrants that the response, be it favorable or unfavorable, will be founded on reasons, reather than sustained by power." Spector, "Judicial Review, Rights, and Democracy," 292 (emphasis adeed).
that are relevant for deciding rights questions and aid in removing arbitrary and extraneous factors from the process.
First, transparency is an important value for government decision-making in general, and regardless of the outcome reached. The ideal constitutional court exemplifies this attribute through, inter alia, its published opinion writing process. Rather than simply declare that the petitioners have won, the constitutional court gives reasons for its decisions. There is a complicated literature about what it is courts do (as a descriptive matter) and ought to do (as a normative matter) in giving reasons for their decisions, but the fact that they give reasons at all is important. And so too is the fact that the reasons they give are expected to be intelligible in the unique cultural and moral setting of their society. Note, too, that this is important whatever the court decides. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, describing the way he and his clerks write opinions, expressed this view of the intrinsic value of transparency:
The editing we do is for clarity and simplicity without losing meaning, and without adding things. You don't see a lot of double entendres, you don't see word play and cuteness. We're not there to win a literary award. We're there to write opinions that some busy person or somebody at their kitchen table can read and say, "I don't agree with a word he said, but I understand what he said." 45 There is great benefit to the public reason-giving that is characteristic of constitutional courts, and this value extends beyond reasons or results that we agree with.
Second, deliberative capacity is a key component of the ideal judicial review process. Both kinds of deliberation are also-like transparency-intrinsically valuable. Whether a judge ultimately votes for the petitioner or for the respondent, the fact that she deliberated about the decision is a non-instrumental process value. Recall that in describing the fairness of judicial review, we required the judges to decide questions ex post, after listening to the competing claims. Once we have this notion, we can see how deliberation is an important value. The deliberation provides evidence that judges are not making decisions on rights questions by using flawed or faulty logic, or worse, by using irrelevant or arbitrary criteria of better and worse arguments.
The third institutional value of judicial review, principled reasoning, builds on the foundation of transparency and deliberative capacity. Not only does the ideal constitutional court write opinions after deliberation, it also gives the kinds of reasons that judges ought to give when deciding rights questions: principled reasons. They are, in short, the kinds of reasons we commonly think are appropriate for theorizing about political morality. As Waldron recognizes, Finally, impartiality is a key procedural virtue realized by an idealized practice of judicial review. We can say that "an impartial procedure . . . is one in which factors extrinsic to the merits of a dispute have no tendency to favor one side of the dispute over another." 50 Impartiality is similar to, and includes, the ideas of neutrality and anonymity that I drew upon to show the fairness of judicial review; it might, in fact be thought of as the conjunction of neutrality and anonymity. Impartiality in the constitutional court means that the judges will decide cases based on the strength of the arguments and claims presented to the court and not on extraneous factors.
Impartiality does not describe the process of decision-making-that is where principled reasoning comes in; rather, it describes the institutional preconditions necessary for that rationally principled posture. As Kavanagh argues, "[s]ince the court upholding an entrenched
Bill of Rights has no interests of its own to further, and is relatively unaccountable to the various political interests in society, it can provide an important forum in which the issues can be decided in light of constitutional principles." 51 Though some scholars see impartiality as an epistemic (and so instrumental) virtue of judicial review, it need not be seen as only valuable in this instrumental sense. Impartiality helps remove the irrelevance. If this is all it did, I think we should still find it valuable.
But even after laying out these four values, and how they are exemplified by judicial review, we still may wonder what this has to do with judicial review's appropriateness for deciding constitutional rights questions. The connection here is that rights questions are particularly suited to procedures exemplifying these four attributes. It is not simply that we value transparency, deliberative capacity, principled reasoning, and impartiality as attributes of decision-making procedures in general (we may in some circumstances and may not in others). It is that we value these four characteristics when dealing with rights questions in particular. And we value these characteristics for more than their supposed ability to help us get to some desirable outcome.
Recall Dworkin's discussion of the lifeboat situation and the problems with majority vote in that context-"kinship, friendships, enmities, jealousies, and other forces that should not make a difference will then be decisive." 52 The problem was not that these kinds of distractions and irrelevancies impeded the passengers from producing the "right outcome"-whatever that could be-but that it distorted the decision-making process in a way that was inappropriate for rights questions. The four values I have outlined perform the same function. We do not appreciate them because they increase the instrumental probability of good results. We think they are important regardless of whether the outcomes are just or unjust in our opinion. When the judiciary possesses these four values, we have reasons to accept that the decision-making process is one that ought to be respected, irrespective of our particular view of the resulting decision. Much in the same way that the collective opinion of the majority (as expressed in legislation) commands our respect in spite of disagreement, so to do judicial decisions on questions of constitutional rights.
It might be helpful at this point to take a step back and locate the argument of this section in the context of the broader whole. Without this situating, one might be tempted to object that these four values cannot conclusively establish the legitimacy of judicial review. That may be true. They may not alone sustain the conclusion that judicial review is a procedurally legitimate institution. But I have not chosen the direct and ad hoc route of arguing that judicial review is legitimate because it instantiates these procedural values that are important for deciding rights questions. Rather, I have set this defense within a broader analytical framework for delegation 
III. PROCEDURALISMS, PURE AND IMPURE
In this final Part, I address the objection that the two legitimacy conditions (individually or in conjunction) comprise outcome-based standards that transform my account into an instrumentalist one. I should note at the outset that I have no interest in defending one kind of pure procedural theory of democratic legitimacy. This kind of pure proceduralism entails that there is no standard independent of the procedure by which we could judge outcomes. There is no such thing as right or just that is independent of the procedure. The outcome simply is right or just because it resulted from the procedure. A situation of fair gambles is supposed to be the paradigmatic pure procedural device: we cannot say that the distribution that results from a situation of fair gambles is right or just independently of the procedures. I do not defend this theory because it seems to me to leave out important considerations of why we value fair procedures in the first place.
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The rejection of (this version of) pure proceduralism, however, is not a rejection of a fundamentally proceduralist account of legitimacy. 54 In other words, one can ground the legitimacy of decisions in the procedure that produced them, without making decisions "evaluable solely in terms of the procedure that brought them about." 55 The difference between this kind of impure proceduralism and an impure instrumentalism is that the former makes fair procedures a necessary condition for legitimacy (if not always sufficient), whereas the latter does not. My account keeps procedures in the foreground. This impure proceduralism also allows a criticism of decisions without thereby calling into question their legitimacy. Bad decisions can be legitimate for the proceduralist and may, all things considered, not command our obedience. The instrumentalist lacks an easy way to distinguish between a legitimate yet bad decision and an illegitimate one.
With Christiano, I contend that while "[p]ure proceduralism is completely false to the practice of democratic citizenship [,] . . . the democratic process has an intrinsic fairness." 56 Thus, although we may be able to say that majority decision can result in deeply unjust decisions according to our preferred principle of justice, our principle of legitimacy privileges procedures 53 I largely agree with the thrust of Brettschneider's project: "Contra pure proceduralists, however, I suggest that at times procedures can produce outcomes that undermine persons' autonomy and equal status. In such cases, the very democratic rationale for fair procedures has been undermined." Brettschneider, "Balancing Procedures and Outcomes Within Democratic Theory: Core Values and Judicial Review," 424.
54 See Christopher G. Griffin, "Debate: Democracy as a Non-Instrumentally Just Procedure," Journal of Political Philosophy 11 (2003): 120 for a proceduralist account that is not purely procedural. 55 See Christiano, "The Authority of Democracy," 1 (emphasis added). Christiano is a good example of an impure proceduralist of the stripe I describe here. Id. at 25. 56 Christiano, "The Authority of Democracy," 4.
above all else. 57 And the limits that the framework I propose establishes are procedural limits on majority vote, not substantive ones.
Yet to even situate this framework in the impure proceduralist camp raises challenging questions of categorization. It is undeniably difficult to determine precisely the boundary between process values and outcome values. For our purposes a helpful starting point is to ask whether the value is a property of the process or of the outcome. But after starting here, we must recognize that there are some values we ascribe to procedures-such as the property "reliable"-that are still ultimately outcome values. We would call a procedure reliable, and thus ascribe the property to the procedure and yet we only think reliability is an important value if we think the procedure is reliably producing some desirable result. So while we might think that propertyspecification is a starting point, we cannot also end there. At this point Joshua Cohen's categorization helps: "a procedural value," he argues, "is a value used for the assessment of procedures without regard to the results of those procedures." 58 It is crucial, therefore, to determine whether the values of "fairness" and "appropriateness" are ascribable because of the results (as reliability is) or without regard to them.
The concern here is that what conditions one and two are really analyzing is the outcome of a delegation decision and not just the process by which it was produced. And the proceduralist was supposed to be unconcerned with outcomes. There is a difference, however, between a substantive outcome and a procedural outcome. I argued earlier that delegation decisions must satisfy more than the minimal legitimacy criterion (i.e., being produced by majority vote)
because by changing future decision procedures they potentially undermine their own justification. This is the same reason the proceduralist can analyze the "outcome" of a delegation produces the most just society, betters its citizens, or promotes the common good; nor do I employ any other instrumental criteria. The conditions of delegation legitimacy are thus still properly viewed as procedural criteria for democratic decision-making.
And we can observe how they operate as procedural restraints. To use an example from Gerry Mackie's excellent treatment of the concept:
To manufacture gunpowder, take saltpeter, charcoal, sulfur, and other inputs, and process them in proper quantity, sequence, and conditions. The materials exist prior to the procedure, but they become inputs to the procedure, which further must handle them properly, for example mixing the inputs in the proper proportion. Both the materials as inputs, and their right handling, are not independent of the manufacturing procedure.
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Like manufacturing gunpowder, it is the right handling of decisional inputs that is governed by conditions one and two of my framework. Fairness, for example, is used here to evaluate the resulting procedure. And the fairness of the procedure is not instrumentally valuable to any particular outcome. It is intrinsically valuable. Condition two, the appropriateness condition, 59 Mackie, "The Values of Democratic Proceduralism," 10.
works similarly. We ascribe the property "appropriate" to the procedure. When analyzing appropriateness we are singularly unconcerned with the consequent decision made using the new procedure. We aren't, therefore, focused on any instrumental benefits that appropriateness provides, but on the fit between the type of issue (i.e. the inputs) and the procedure. Thus, even though conditions one and two look to the "result" of the delegation decision itself, they examine only the procedural values exemplified by the procedural outcome.
There is, then, no good reason to think that a proceduralist cannot subscribe to the two conditions outlined above. The newly delegated-to procedure must be both fair and appropriate.
Neither of these conditions hinges on controversial judgments about what procedure promotes the common interest or best serves the common good. In short, the account here is fundamentally procedural. It is about procedures all the way down, even if this requires analyzing procedural outcomes.
Once we have seen how each condition remains procedural, we can assess more closely how the principle of legitimacy that these two conditions encompass is itself essentially procedural. First, however, it is useful to distinguish the principle of legitimacy for a simple fair proceduralist:
Simple Here we can see that production by a fair and appropriate procedure remains a necessary condition for A's legitimacy-whether it is a delegation decision or not. But if A is a delegation decision, then the new procedure Z must be a fair and appropriate procedure as well.
Returning once more to the lifeboat example, we can see how the qualified principle works. Running this through the qualified proceduralist principle, we see that the decision about which procedure to use for deciding who should leave the lifeboat is a delegation decision, and consequently needs to be made by a fair and appropriate procedure and in turn prescribe a fair and appropriate procedure. The decision is made using majority vote, and majority vote is fair and appropriate for deciding which procedure to use. So long as one of the new selected procedures is both fair and appropriate for deciding whom to throw off, the delegation decision is legitimate and thereby binds the participants. It is crucial to emphasize that majority vote is not one of the procedures that the participants are choosing from when they prescribe another procedure to use. We already found that majority vote is not fair or appropriate for making the decision about whom to throw off, even if it is fair and appropriate for picking which procedure to use to decide that question. Thus, the qualified proceduralist principle of legitimacy does not framework with which to analyze majority decisions to delegate final decision-making authority more broadly. This framework rests on the premise that "the purpose of legitimacy inquiries is to determine whether citizens have a moral reason to accede to political decisions with which they substantively disagree."
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The qualified proceduralist principle of legitimacy that I employed was an attempt to instantiate this moral ideal. It required that delegation decisions be authorized by a fair and appropriate procedure and in turn authorize a fair and appropriate procedure. On this account, we have no moral reason to accede to the political decision that elects a dictator. But when judges on a constitutional court have been authorized to exercise judicial review, we have reasons to think this delegation is legitimate. Consistent with the qualified proceduralist principle, the decision to create the constitutional court was made (we stipulated) by a fair and appropriate procedure, majority vote; and, since this creation was a delegation decision, we also had to be sure that the procedure of judicial review is fair and appropriate for its delegated issues. I have argued it is.
Citizens in jurisdictions where courts are authorized to exercise the powers of judicial review have reasons to accept decisions they disagree with. Here Richard Wollheim's paradox of democracy is mirrored in a paradox of judicial review. In a democracy, I might affirm both that A is my preferred outcome (and the one I think most just) and affirm also that B ought to be the 60 Robert H. Bork, "Judicial Review and Democracy," Society (1986), 5. 61 Fallon, "The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review," 1719.
outcome because it received the most votes in the assembly. In the same vein, I might affirm both that a win for the petitioner is my preferred outcome (and the one I think most just) and affirm also that a win for the respondent ought to be the outcome because it received the most votes on the constitutional court. "Anyone," says Waldron, "whose theory of authority gives the Supreme Court power to make decisions must-as much as any democrat-face up to the paradox that the option he thinks just may sometimes not be the option which, according to his theory of authority, should be followed. The qualified proceduralist principle of legitimacy that I proposed does just that. And because judicial review satisfies that standard, the majority's decision to institute the practice is legitimate. It is morally binding in a way that the election of a tyrant never could be.
62 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 247. 63 Waldron, "The Core of the Case against Judicial Review," 1406 n. 65 (emphasis added).
